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It is widespread international practice that cargo liners meet at  regular 
conferences to fix prices and quotas for individual routes.  Presently, 
however, the respective European regulation granting liners an exemption 
from competition laws is under review. Liners claim that conferences are a 
necessary pre-condition for the provision of reliable services. In contrast, 
we demonstrate that there is  little evidence for  a destabilizing effect of 
competition, while conferences can themselves give rise to instability. The 
liners association (ELAA) has, in response to the  EU  review process, 
proposed an information exchange system as an alternative. In our view 
this has some merits. Transfer of data might even be mandatory, 
information output should be aggregated and anonymized and made 
available to the general public. We are skeptical, however, about any 
‘discussions’ between liners that go further than anonymized information 
exchange.
                                                 
* Both authors come from the Berlin University of Technology, Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP), 
aic@wip.tu-berlin.de, km@wip.tu-berlin.de. - 2 - 
Zusammenfassung 
In der Containerseeschifffahrt ist es weltweit üblich, dass sich die Reeder 
in Konferenzen über Frachtraten und  -quoten  für spezifische 
Handelsrouten  abstimmen. In Europa  wird jedoch die Regulierung, die 
diese Ausnahme vom Wettbewerbsrecht erlaubt, von der EU-Kommission 
zur Zeit überprüft. Die Reeder argumentieren, dass Konferenzen nötig 
sind, um ein stabiles Angebot sicherzustellen. Wir kommen jedoch zu dem 
Schluss, dass es keine Anhaltspunkte für außerodentlich destabilisierende 
Effekte von Konkurrenz gibt. Im Gegenteil zeigt sich, dass eher die 
Konferenzen destabilisierende Effekte erzeugen können. Die Assoziation 
der Reedereien (ELAA) hat, unter dem Druck der Überprüfung durch die 
EU, als Alternative die Einrichtung eines Informationsaustauschsystems 
vorgeschlagen. Dies hat aus unserer Sicht einige Vorteile. Man könnte die 
Übermittlung von Daten sogar zur Pflicht machen; der daraus gewonnene 
Informations-Output sollte aggregiert und anonymisiert sein und der 
allgemeinen Öffentlichkeit zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Wir sind jedoch 
skeptisch gegenüber „Diskussionen“ zwischen den Reedern, die über den 
anonymisierten Informationsaustausch hinausgehen. - 3 - 
1  Introduction 
The containerized liner shipping industry is a vital factor for the European economy. 
Container transport by sea accounts for around 20% of EU25 external trade in value 
terms (import and export, EC 2004). The worldwide largest three liners are European 
ones (see table 1).  The routes connecting Asia and Europe, jointly with the routes 
connecting  Asia and the USA,  are by far the most important trade routes. 
Furthermore, since the yearly growth rates of  trades from Asia to the USA and to 
Europe amounted to more than 15% in 2003 the relevance of those routes increased 
significantly (see table 2), and can be expected to be growing in the future. 
Table 1  Top 10 liners. 




Share of world 
capacity 
Maersk/Sealand  Denmark  305  848,611  9.4% 
MSC  Switzerland  250  649,403  7.2% 
P&O Nedlloyd  UK/Netherlands  144  412,519  4.5% 
CMA CGM  France  124  353,678  3.9% 
Evergreen  Taiwan  124  344,285  3.8% 
APL  Singapore  96  307,094  3.4% 
Cosco  China  110  274,465  3.0% 
Hanjin  Republic of Korea  68  271,644  3.0% 
CSCL  China  103  247,812  2.7% 
NYK  Japan  74  243,339  2.7% 
Sum    1,398  3,952,850  43.6% 
World fleet    7,594  9,070,065  100% 
*TEU: Twenty foot equivalent unit. 
Source: Containerization International online database accessed 29 January 2005. - 4 - 
Table 2  Estimated cargo flows in millions of TEU along major trades routes. 








2002  8.81  3.90  6.13  3.94  2.59  1.50 
2003  10.19  4.12  7.06  4.00  2.56  1.58 
% change  15.70  5.60  15.20  1.50  -1.0  5.30 
Source: UNCTAD, 2004. 
2  Cooperation in the liner shipping industry 
A closer look at table 2 shows that cargo flows  are not  balanced on the most 
important trade routes. Flows from Asia to the USA exceed those in t he opposite 
direction; likewise, flows from Asia to Europe  and from Europe  to the USA  are 
significantly higher than the respective flows back. To manage such imbalances, to 
meet the growing demand, and to improve cost efficiency  liners engage more and 
more in various forms of cooperation.  Consortia and alliances have become of 
special importance during the last decade. Consortia represent operational, technical 
or commercial agreements between different sea carriers to pool all or some of their 
activities o n  particular trade routes (PC 2004). Alliances represent agreements 
between carriers to cooperate on a global basis. 
It is n oteworthy, however, that  consortia and alliances do not fix cargo rates or 
quotas. Therefore, they complement conferences, which have a long tradition, where 
liners meet regularly  and decide jointly  upon  cargo rates and shipping quotas  for 
trading routes. While cartels are usually forbidden by competition laws, liners enjoy a 
special status, almost throughout the world. In Europe,  for  example,  Council 
Regulation 4056/86 allows certain categories of agreements, decisions or concerted 
practices by liner shipping conferences which boil down to a block exemption from 
Article 81(1) on competition of the EC Treaty (EC 2004). 
During the 1980s, non-conference liners (in the following ‘independent liners’) began 
to play a bigger role (FMC 2001), particularly for the US and Australian trades. As a 
consequence,  so-called ‘discussion agreements’ evolved as another  form of 
cooperation between liners. Discussion agreements provide a forum for information 
exchange  between  conference  liners and independent liners. In contrast to 
conferences, they do not make binding agreements on freight rates and capacity. 
Still, delicate information is being exchanged, covering freight rates, costs, capacities, - 5 - 
and conditions of service for particular routes, so that discussion agreements also 
require exemption from cartel laws (PC 2004).  
The r ationale  for block exemption  was  the presumption that the liner shipping 
industry, in contrast to other industries, operates under unique conditions of ‘inherent 
instability’. The following specific features of the industry are brought forward (ELAA 
2004). Demand is inelastic, but of great variability ( sensitive to business cycles, 
exchange rates, and other), and unbalanced on important  trade routes. Supply 
conditions are characterized by h igh fixed costs (of, e.g., ships) and lumpiness of 
capacities, implying inelastic supply both in the short and medium term. Since there 
is no or little regulatory intervention, periodic incidents of over- and undercapacity 
would evolve in the absence of conferences, with the consequence of erratic price 
movements. These would imply  high risk for some operative decisions and for 
investments. The result could be a collapse of investments and a breakdown of the 
market on certain routes. To avoid this, conferences and discussion agreements are 
deemed necessary pre-conditions for the provision of reliable schedules to shippers.  
Shippers, however, are critical of the stabilizing effects of conferences (ESC 2004). 
They complain that conferences act as a barrier to trade, inflate shipping prices and 
threaten the sustainability of international shipping services. Partly as a response to 
these complaints, EU Regulation 4056/86 is currently under review. The question is 
whether the ‘uniqueness’ of the liner shipping industry is still important enough (if it 
has ever been) to justify the exemption from competition laws. This is to be seen in 
the light of recent market developments. The growing importance of consortia and 
alliances and the increasing concentration in the liner shipping industry during the 
last 20 years (see figure 1) put into question whether liners are so vulnerable to 
regional or temporary market conditions. Moreover, liners increasingly offer long-run 
service contracts. Such contracts establish cargo rates for a predetermined period 
and thereby contribute to rate stability (EC 2004). - 6 - 
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3  A closer look at ’inherent instability’ 
Price movements are a common phenomenon in many markets.  In some markets, 
like oil, w e experience long and protracted price swings.  In other markets, like 
hardware and software, dramatic price falls have been observed.  There are also 
markets with excessive price fluctuations and supply conditions that are comparable 
to the liner shipping industry,  like the airline industry.  However, in n one of these 
cases  did we see a collapse of investments or a breakdown of companies on a 
massive scale. Let’s therefore take a closer look at the logic behind the claim that 
liner shipping markets are ‘inherently unstable’, and try to assess its consequences. 
 
Unstable prices under stable demand and supply conditions 
The standard explanation of ‘inherent instability’ rests on the possibility that there 
may not exist a price equilibrium in the liner shipping market. The argument, as put 
forth by Sjostrom 1989 and Telser 1996, can be illustrated by  a simple example. 
Suppose a market with two liners, one ship each, and three shippers. Each shipper 
wants to ship exactly one good and is willing to pay at most 10 Euro for the transfer. - 7 - 
Each liner has a transport capacity of two goods and the cost per trip is 5 Euro. This 
example has some of  the  properties  mentioned above:  demand and supply are 
lumpy, and inelastic for a wide range of prices. In particular, one liner can operate at 
full capacity while the other has to put up with half capacity. We show that there is no 
stable price (per good transferred) that clears the market. Moreover, there is not even 
a stable combination of two different prices by the two liners that could prevail. 
To see this, suppose liner A sets a rather high price, say pA=8. Liner B would then 
undercut him slightly, say pB=7.5, in order to attract two shippers and earn 15-5=10. 
Since liner A would then earn only 8-5=3, he would now have an incentive to change 
its initial price and undercut liner B. The same argument can be applied to any price 
higher than 5, which shows that there is no stable price equilibrium in which a firm 
chooses a price higher than 5. Now suppose that liner A sets a rather low price, say 
pA =4. Its rival will then compare two alternatives. He can either undercut liner A (this 
yields at most 8-5=3), or rather set a very high price and be satisfied with only one 
customer (this yields at most 10-5=5). Whatever he does, liner A will again have a 
reason to revise its price. In particular, if liner B chooses a very high price, say pB 
=9.5, then liner A would want to increase its price to, say, pA =9. The same argument 
can be applied to any price below or equal to 5. In short, liners find no price at all that 
makes them satisfied with their choice, given the response by the other firm. They 
always find a reason to revise it. 
The example shows that, indeed, prices can be inherently unstable. But what is the 
consequence? It does not mean that the market breaks down. In our example, liners 
would  simply  try to take each other by surprise. One can actually calculate the 
probability density function of their price-mixing behavior (a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium). Choice will be confined to prices between 5 and 10, so that both liners 
will almost always make a positive operating profit. If the situation of our example 
would come up regularly, firms will sometimes turn out to be lucky (“this time I 
managed to undercut my rival slightly” or “this time I rightly chose a high-price, since 
my rival’s offer was just too cheap to undercut”) and sometimes not so lucky.  
From everyday experience we are well-acquainted with  such pricing behavior. It 
resembles the well-known sales offers by large retail stores – with the latter being far 
from a breakdown. Recent examples from the transport sector are the irregluar price 
cuttings and sales offers in the airline industry. There may be some indications that - 8 - 
this industry  could be ripe for a consolidation; but no-one expects that airfares will 
ever rise again to the heights of former times. In our simple example, the expected 
profit of each liner would be about 5 and the expected price about 7; a stable cartel, 
in contrast, would fix the price at almost 10, leaving no surplus for the shippers. 
 
Unstable demand  
In the above example there is price instability in spite of stable demand conditions. 
Let’s now extend the example by adding demand uncertainty. Suppose that there 
may turn up either two, three, four, or five shippers in the market (each event with 
probability 0.25). If only two shippers turn up, capacities of the two liners are grossly 
oversized, so that prices will be driven down to 2.5. Only one ship will make the trip, 
and both liners’ operating profits will be zero. The case with three shippers has been 
discussed above; it results in a price-mixing behavior yielding an expected operating 
profit of about 5 that can be used to cover fixed cost elements. When four shippers 
turn up,  capacities are just right and, if shippers  have difficulties negotiating, the 
prices will be quite high. Prices will be particularly high when there are five shippers; 
rates are then competed upwards due to capacity shortage. 
Taking the expectation of operating profits over all four market situations  yields a 
strictly positive  expected operating profit that can be used to cover fixed cost 
elements. (If expected profits are extraordinarily high, market entry by other liners 
would bring them down to normal rates.)  Thus, there is again no reason for a 
breakdown of the market or a collapse of investments. There is  of course price 
variability but, as in many other industries, price swings cancel out in the longer run. 
Particularly the larger carriers will be able to diversify price risk internally so that it 
should not affect their investment decisions very much. Note finally that the price-
mixing behavior appears only in one out of the four situations (namely, when  just 
three shippers turn up); it seems to be a rather rare phenomenon. 
Our example suggests that prices in the liner shipping industry may be, but need not 
be, inherently unstable in the absence of conferences. Moreover, if they are unstable, 
this need not be a problem. Things will be different when there are conferences. Not 
only can average prices be expected to be higher, there might also be more 
instability in the market. This will now be demonstrated. - 9 - 
 
4  The effects of conferences 
How do conferences affect the market result? If all liners join the conference and 
choose prices to maximize their  joint profits, prices would clearly be higher.  In our 
example, price would be set at (almost) 10, regardless of the number of shippers who 
turn up, to extract surplus from the shippers.  
Since conference membership is not mandatory, but open to everyone, one might 
wonder how many liners will actually join in. On the major trade routes conferences 
have market shares between 40% and 70% (EC 2004). Therefore, competition 
between conference liners and independent liners is of significant importance. When 
a liner chooses to join the conference or not he will compare two effects. On the one 
hand, it is attractive to become an independent liner and be able to undercut the 
conference price (second-mover advantage in price competition). This is based on 
the realistic presumption that the conference, which dominates the market and has 
some intertia in its decisions, is a price leader and independent liners are the 
followers. Of course, the conference will anticipate competition by  the independent 
liners and start out with a rather low price. Therefore, on the other hand, reducing the 
number of independents by joining the conference has the advantage that one can 
profit from a rather high price, since the conference price will be the higher the lower 
the number of independent liners. Comparing these effects, each liner will decide to 
join the conference or not. Depending on the total number of firms, it turns out that 
either all join in, or  that  there is  also a group of  one or more independent liners 
around it. Generally, the following holds. For any given number of carriers, prices are 
the lower the larger the number of independent liners is. Quite plausibly, price will be 
somewhere in between the case of full conference membership and the fully 
competitive case (i.e. without conferences). Moreover, the larger the number of 
carriers in the market the larger will be the subset of independent liners. Thus, the 
larger the number of carriers in the market the lower will be the price. In any case, a 
ban of conferences would always lead to a further price reduction. - 10 - 
Table 3  Pay-offs of a conference liner (first number) and a potential entrant (second number) 
when the potential entrant chooses from (N,C,I). 
N  C  I 
3, 0  0.5, 0.5  –1, 1 
 
Moreover, competition between conference liners and independent liners turns out to 
be another  source of  market  instability  once the possibility  of entry is taken into 
account.  A potential entrant  can choose between three alternatives:  becoming a 
conference liner (C), becoming an independent liner (I), or not entering the market at 
all (N).  Table 3 illustrates a situation of inherent instability. It assumes that, with 
agiven number of firms before entry, everyone would join the conference. The 
potential entrant, liner A, can choose from the strategies (N,C,I). For each strategy 
the table lists the payoffs of each conference member and of the entrant, assumed in 
this example. As the numbers indicate (0<0.5<1) the entrant would prefer to enter as 
an independent liner (here the second-mover advantage dominates). However, once 
this has happened, the market is not profitable any more for conference members 
(the -1). Hence, one of them, say liner B, should leave the market (assuming that it is 
not profitable to become a second independent liner). After this has happened, the 
number of liners in the market is the same as before, and, as already stated, for that 
number it is optimal for all of them to join the conference. Thus, the entrant A who 
came in as an independent liner will now have an incentive to join the conference. 
But if he does, this will invite the other liner, B, who dropped out of the market, to re-
enter again as an independent liner. And so on. 
One might argue that the independent liner A will not join the conference if this 
triggers re-entry of liner B. But why not? If liner B re-enters, some other conference 
liner (say, liner C)  might  drop out of the market as a response. Moreover, the 
sequence of moves is not always as clear as indicated above. There may also be 
some uncertainty or inertia in liner B’s re-entry to the market. Therefore it is quite 
plausible to expect some circling of market participation and  of  conference 
membership in the above example. Is this a problem? It is more of a problem than 
the mixing of prices that we observed in our first example. Mixing and circling with 
market entry and exit is directly related to investment decisions, and there are also 
real transaction costs of entry and exit (like fixed costs of renting harbor facilities and - 11 - 
making some specific investments in harbors; costs of licences, advertising, and 
reallocation of ships).  
It therefore appears that the existence of conferences (with non-mandatory, but open 
membership) not only leads to higher prices on average, but also to more uncertainty 
with respect to entry and investment decisions. Concerning uncertainty, there might 
be a tragic misperception in the liner shipping industry. There is a traditional 
consensus among liners that conferences contribute to stability of supply conditions. 
Thus, if one observes market instability which is actually induced by the presence of 
a conference, liners  would tend to reinforce their support of the conference for its 
presumed stabilizing effect. 
 
5  ELAA proposal for an Information Exchange System 
As a response to EU Commission’s review of Regulation 4056/86 (block exemption) 
the European Liners Affairs Association (ELAA) was established in May 2003 to 
represent the liners’ position in this process. On 6 August 2004 the ELAA submitted a 
“Proposal for a new  Regulatory Structure” (in the following “the Proposal”) 
accompanied by two market studies by Charles River Associates. In the Proposal the 
ELAA pursues a two-tier strategy. In a first line of defence, it denies need for reform 
of Regulation 4056/86, arguing that conferences are effectively not used to push up 
prices above average costs (at least since about 1998). However, in view of the fact 
that the block exemption is under heavy criticism by the EU Commission, the ELAA 
proposes, in a second line of defence, that at least an information exchange system 
should be allowed in the future, quite similar to the ‘discussion agreements’ in U.S. 
and Australian trades.  The design of the system is sketched in the Proposal. The 
ELAA emphasizes that, in contrast to Regulation 4056/86, the new Proposal makes 
no reference to ‘price fixing’ or the ‘regulation’ or ‘limitation’ of supply or capacity, and 
rightly points out that this represents a significant change in the position adopted by 
the industry.  
The proposed information exchange system  is  run  by  the industry itself.  Industry 
bodies or agreements will set up ‘committees per trade’ that carry out the operative 
tasks. The system will still require exemption from competition laws, due to the kinds - 12 - 
of information to be exchanged. These are (cited from the ELAA proposal, see also 
figure 2): 
1.  Exchange and discussion between lines of aggregated capacity utilization and 
market size data by trade and on a region/zone to region/zone basis (historic data 
with a month’s delay); 
2.  Exchange, discussion and evaluation of commodity developments by trade 
(based on data aggregated with a month’s delay); 
3.  Discussion and evaluation of aggregate supply and demand data by 
trade/commodity. Forecasts of demand by trade and commodity would be 
published; 
4.  Lines will obtain their own market share by trade, by region, and by port (data 
aggregated with a month’s delay); 
5.  Price index differentiated by type of equipment (e.g. reefer, dry) and/or trade (data 
aggregated with a quarterly delay). This  information would be made publicly 
available; 
6.  Surcharges and ancillary charges based on publicly available and transparent 
formulae; the details of which would be discussed with shippers. 
The Proposal leaves some room for discussion. The main question is whether an 
information exchange system  and  discussions  will facilitate tacit collusion ( i.e. 
collusion  which works  without any  explicit  agreement at all) or hidden collusion 
(which is based on  illegally organized agreements and enforcements) that could 
replace the current system of legalized agreements on prices and quantities.  This 
question is discussed at some length in a study ‘Competitive Impacts of Information 
Exchange’ by Charles River Associates as annex to the Proposal. To a large extend 
it surveys  the recent literature on industrial organization on the topic.  It should be 
noted, however, that the CRA study is silent about the ‘discussions’ of data. 
 
Pros and cons of information exchange 
A good starting point of the CRA study is the assertion that information exchange is 
almost always positive to welfare (i.e. to all the parties involved: liners, shippers, 
ports, and final consumers) if it does not give rise to competition concerns. The point - 13 - 
here is that liners, although in competition, have many common concerns over which 
they would like to exchange information. The CRA study lists many economic 
aspects that can be improved by such information exchange: development of new 
products, investment decisions, organizational learning, lower search costs, and so 
on. 














(by trade, region, port)
CommodityDevelopments
Price Index 
(by trade/ by type of equipment)
- Load Port / Discharge Port
- Volume (20‘ / 40‘ / CMB)
- Cargo Details
- Shipper Details
- Shipper / Consignee Data
- Price
- Quarterly Aggregate Only
- Average Rates / Trade
Monthly / Aggregate
 
Source: ELAA 2004. 
There are, however, some counter-examples where information exchange might not 
work  to the benefit of all parties.  In particular, s hippers may feel uneasy that too 
much information about them is being exchanged, allowing liners to price-
discriminate very effectively among them, so that most of the surplus is drawn away 
from them. This is an instance where information exchange has a ‘collusive effect’ 
without any collusion at all (neither tacit nor hidden). Firms simply inform each other 
about current demand characteristics which helps them to extract higher rents from 
shippers. The example shows that the content of information exchange should be 
controlled by competition authorities and revised regularly. 
The Proposal  acknowledges that  some important pieces of information should be 
made available to the general public (namely, demand forecasts, price indices, and - 14 - 
surcharge formulae; see items 3, 5, and 6 of the list above). This leaves the question 
why information on capacity utilization, market size,  and particularly  commodity 
developments (items 1 and 2) and possibly also some market concentration indices 
(as part of item 4) shall not also be publicized. Shippers and ports, for example, may 
want to use this information for improving efficiency. Furthermore, an extensive data 
base  can improve the ability of competition authorities  to watch  and evaluate the 
market. 
One might ask whether liners would be less willing to convey data if all information 
output is made public. However, if liners want to inform each other, but not ports or 
shippers, the information is probably used to the disadvantage of the latter ones, so 
that its exchange should not be allowed. To conclude, w e are sceptical about any 
non-public exchange of information. 
 
Anonymized information 
With reference to the theoretical and empirical literature on industrial organization 
(particularly an earlier survey by Kühn and Vives 1995) the CRA study warns that the 
exchange of individualized information (i.e. single liners’ prices, quantities, or general 
contracting conditions) would be particularly conducive to collusion because it would 
allow to pin down individual behavior  and write  hidden contracts, i.e. internally 
enforceable cartel agreements, on it. A look at the Proposal confirms that information 
output is planned to be aggregated and anonymized. Indeed, aggregating the data to 
a sufficient degree is probably the right measure to avoid its use as a basis for 
collusion.  This argument calls for transmission of only coarse information  to 
guarantee that carriers do not receive individualized information about competitors. 
Taking this into account, it appears to be a risky idea to provide liners with more 
detailed information on their own market position, as is proposed in item 4 of the list. 
Cartels could use data on  individual market shares to monitor each other, by 
agreeing on a regular, hidden exchange of this (hard) information.  
According to the Proposal, information transmitted should be based on historic data 
with a month’s delay. On the other hand, the ELAA points out that it would be useful 
for planning purposes to make more recent data available (in the current system, 
information is exchanged on a weekly basis). T he relevant issue is again that of 
anonymity. If it is not possible to single out individual transactions from the changes - 15 - 
in  aggregate market data there is no reason not to provide market data more 
frequently, say every one or two weeks. 
 
On designing an information exchange system 
To sum up, an information exchange system seems to be useful and welfare 
enhancing if it is carefully designed and under constant control of competition 
authorities. The Proposal assumes that an information exchange system is based on 
voluntary participation.  This rises questions about, both, the completeness  and 
reliability  of the data set, since an industry committee based on voluntary 
participation may not have the authority to enforce quality standards. Therefore, in 
order to  guarantee  a high  quality of data for planning purposes,  a mandatory 
information exchange system, where liners are liable for the quality of data provided, 
might be more advisable. 
All information output must be anonymized and aggregated to a sufficient degree to 
impede collusion. As long as this requirement can be met, data should be provided 
with a high frequency, may be every one or two weeks, in order to ensure that liners 
can quickly react to new market developments. In principle, all information should be 
made public. The exclusive provision of individualized data on market shares to the 
respective liners should only be allowed if it can be guaranteed that this data cannot 
be exchanged between liners as hard information.  Furthermore, the competition 
authorities should  have  access  to the raw  data in case of  a  dispute on anti-
competitive behaviour. 
We are sceptial with respect to ‘discussions’ of market data. It is noteworthy that the 
Proposal, as well as the accompanying CRA study, is completely silent about the 
exact content and purpose of ‘discussions’ (let alone stating any rules). The cloudy 
word alone stirs suspicions that ‘discussions’ will turn out to be a formidable platform 
for communication between  liners that can be used to hamper and manipulate 
competition.  There are many examples where f irms  proved to be  very inventive 
using communication channels open to them for colluding.  Thus, unless  the ELAA 
can give very good reasons for very well-defined ‘discussions’, the latter ones should 
not be allowed. 
 - 16 - 
6  Conclusions 
EU Regulation 4056/86, that gives cargo liners the right to hold conferences to fix 
prices and transport quotas  (block exemption), is  currently  under review.  It  was 
implemented  on the grounds that  the cargo liner shipping industry supposedly 
suffered from an ’inherent instability’. We have illustrated a situation in which there 
does not exist a market equilibrium with stable prices. However, this does not imply a 
breakdown of the market or collapse of investments.  In contrast,  there is then an 
equilibrium  with  mixed prices where firms constantly try to take each other by 
surprise, similar to the sales offers by retail stores or airlines. On expectation, such 
mixing equilibrium generates positive profits for liners and is  also  preferable for 
shippers, as compared to cartelization by conferences. Moreover, the current move 
to concentration and forming of consortia and alliances improves liners’ or consortia’s 
ability to diversify price variability internally. And the wide use of individual service 
contracts with long-term price agreements reduces price risks for both sides. 
We also illustrated  that competition between conference liners and independent 
liners can contribute to instability of market entry and exit.  This type of market 
instability appears to be more wasteful than pure price instability. For these reasons 
we conclude that traditional conferences are not an adequate measure to enhance 
the market performance of the cargo liner shipping industry. T hey should be 
abolished. 
As Regulation 4056/86 is under heavy criticism, the liners’ association ELAA has, in a 
remarkable effort, advanced a proposal for a pure ‘information exchange system’ that 
will not fix prices or quotas. It is a voluntary system where industry data is collected 
and later on provided to liners in an aggregated form and with a delay of at least one 
month. Some additional,  more detailed data on market shares should be given to 
each liner exclusively.  The proposal  also suggests  that  there should be  data 
‘discussions’ between liners,  however,  it  leaves unclear what is really meant by 
‘discussions’ and why they are needed. 
The literature on industrial organization suggests that information exchange is usually 
welfare enhancing, as long as it  does  not serve as a basis for anti-competitive, 
collusive behaviour. As the value of an information exchange system depends on the 
quality  of  data,  we propose to make participation mandatory, so as  to guarantee 
completeness and reliability of the data. Still, it seems a good idea that the committee - 17 - 
collecting and processing the data is an industry body, not a government agency. 
Since not only liners, but also ports and shippers and the regulatory authority (and 
the general public) have an interest in observing market developments, the 
information output should generally be made public. Fresh information should be 
provided as often as possible, as long as this meets the requirement that individual 
transactions cannot be singled out. In order to prevent collusion, it must be assured 
that no liner-specific data will circulate among liners and that no ‘discussions’ take 
place that allow for uncontrolled communication and agreements between liners. 
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